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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report summarizes our analysis of whether individual augmentation (IA) 
deployment is affecting retention rates for Navy enlisted personnel and junior officers.  
Our analytical approach was to compare retention rates between those personnel who 
have been deployed via IA to equivalent cohorts of Navy personnel who have not been 
on an IA deployment.  “Equivalent” means matching by (or controlling for in 
multivariate models) observable characteristics such as deployment experience, rank/pay 
grade, warfare specialty/rating, Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) for enlisted 
personnel, family status, gender, and race/ethnicity. 
We compared retention rates in three different ways:  aggregate comparisons, 
comparisons by individual demographic categories, and comparisons based on standard 
statistical modeling techniques (logistic regression), in order to simultaneously control 
for all the demographic and other observable characteristics.  In this report, we present 
detailed results for enlisted personnel and summarize the results for junior officers.  
Additional analyses for junior officers were conducted by our thesis student,  
Lieutenant Michael Paisant, USN, and those results are documented in Paisant (2008). 
Our data consisted of a list of those active component Navy personnel deployed 
via IA since March 2002 and monthly administrative records for all active component 
Navy personnel from October 1997 through September 2007.  The former was provided 
by Pers-4 and contained, among other information, the name, rank/pay grade, SSN, and 
date deployed of each individual.  The latter was compiled from extracts of the Proxy 
Perstempo file maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) containing 
monthly information on all active component personnel in the Navy, including name, 
rank/pay grade, social security number (SSN), designator/rating, gender, race/ethnicity, 
AFQT scores (for enlisted personnel), expiration of term of service (ETS), and a  
DMDC-derived measure of deployment experience. 
WHAT DID WE FIND OUT? 
Overall, we found little evidence that IA deployment is hurting retention rates 
among those who have experienced one or more IA deployments.  In fact, in almost all of 
our comparisons, the retention rates of those who have had one or more IA deployments 
(“IAers”) were higher than the retention rates of their Navy colleagues who have only 
been on conventional Navy deployments (“non-IAers”).  See Figures 1 and 2 for 
aggregate comparison results. 
 
Figure 1.   Percent of non-IAer and IAer enlisted personnel retained. 
 
Figure 2.   Percent of non-IAer and IAer junior officers retained. 
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The only categories where we found lower retention rates for IAers compared to 
non-IAers were for E-3s and E-4s and, in these cases, the decrease in retention rates was 
only about one percent (see Figure 3).1
 
Figure 3.   Comparison of the percent retained by pay grade and IA status.  
E-2, E-4, E-5, and E-9 personnel on IAs had slightly lower 
retention rates than non-IAers in those pay grades. 
Given that retention rates for Navy enlisted personnel and junior officers are 
generally higher for those who deployed via IA, we conclude the following:  It is unlikely 
that IA deployment causes a significant decrease in retention propensity, at least in terms 
of the personnel outcomes observed thus far. 
SOME CAVEATS FOR OUR FINDINGS 
We temper these findings with a number of caveats: 
• Though IA deployments have been occurring for six years now, we were 
only able to observe retention decisions on a fraction of those who have 
been on an IA deployment and these were more likely to be individuals 
                                                 
1 We also did find decreases for E-2s and E-9s, but the number of IAers in those groups was too small 
to be considered definitive. 
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who deployed early in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Hence, the results 
observed thus far may not be typical of what is yet to come.  See Chapter 
4 for additional discussion. 
• We were not able to identify those who volunteered for an IA deployment 
from those who did not.  Thus, it is possible that a higher retention rate for 
volunteers is masking a lower rate for nonvolunteers.  See Chapter 4 for 
additional discussion. 
• Similarly, because this is observational data with strong self-selection 
effects likely present (at least for the volunteers), it is not possible to 
conclude that there is any causal relationship between IA deployments and 
increased retention rates. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Given the above caveats, we suggest that additional, on-going research is 
warranted.  Some of our recommendations for such research are briefly summarized here.  
These and other recommendations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
• Recommendation:  Repeat this Analysis Annually.  While our research 
did not find any strong negative effects of IA deployment on retention, 
retention outcomes have been observed on only a small fraction of those 
who have been on an IA deployment.  Future analyses should be 
conducted to track these trends over time. 
• Recommendation:  Identify and Analyze Nonvolunteers.  We were not 
able to identify those who did not volunteer for an IA deployment.  If 
nonvolunteers can be identified, their retention patterns should be assessed 
since it is possible that higher rates of retention for volunteers are masking 
lower retention rates among nonvolunteers. 
• Recommendation:  Analyze Reservists.  This analysis only considered 
active component (AC) sailors and officers.  A majority of Navy personnel 
deployed via IA come from the reserve component (RC).  Without 
 v
additional analysis, there is no reason to believe that the results of this 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
OPNAVINST 1001.24, dated 5 July 2000, established the policies and procedures 
for U.S. Navy personnel individual augmentation (IA) deployment to combatant 
commands.  As of September 2006, more than 10,000 sailors were serving globally in IA 
billets, of which more than 8,500 were assigned to the United States Central Command 
(Rhumb Lines, 2006).  Of these, more than 2,000 sailors were serving in Iraq (Navy 
Newsstand, 23 January 2007).  As of March 2008, almost 20,000 active duty sailors and 
naval officers have served or are serving on an IA deployment. 
In early 2007, Admiral Mullen, then the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), stated 
that IAs will continue:  “I see this as a long-term commitment by the Navy.  I’m anxious 
to pitch in as much as we possibly can, for the duration of this war.  Not only can we do 
our share, but [we can] take as much stress off those who are deploying back-to-back, 
home one year, deployed one year and now are on their third or fourth deployment” 
(Navy Newsstand, 23 January 2007). 
Given that IAs will continue for the foreseeable future, it is important to assess 
whether they are having an effect on enlisted and officer retention.  Also in early 2007, 
Rear Admiral Masso, then the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, 
Personnel, Training and Education), addressed the Surface Navy Association Conference 
saying, “Since 2002, 82 percent of our IA’s have come from the Reserve component, yet 
I see letters of resignation from officers listing a fear of IA duty as being the reason they 
are getting out.  IA duty affects two percent of the surface warfare officer (SWO) 
community, yet if you speak to a junior officer on the waterfront, you would think that 
half of their wardroom are IAs” (Navy Newsstand, 11 January 2007). 
Of course, simply because IAs are cited as a reason for leaving the service does 
not mean that IAs are, in fact, negatively affecting the retention of those who have been 
on an IA assignment (or those who have not experienced an IA, for that matter).  For 
example, Fricker (2002) and Hosek and Totten (2002, 1998) studied the effects of hostile 
deployment on military retention in the 1990s.  The conventional wisdom at that time 
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was that such deployments caused decreased retention.  In fact, just the opposite effect 
was found:  Fricker’s work showed that officers who experienced one or more 
deployments, hostile or otherwise, were more likely to be retained in the service.  Hosek 
and Totten found an equivalent effect for enlisted service members. 
However, these results are now dated, given that both the pace and types of 
deployment have changed since Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)—particularly in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) since 2003.  The 20,000 active-duty naval 
personnel who have served or are serving on an IA deployment represent almost five 
percent of the active Navy force.  Furthermore, IA deployments differ fundamentally 
from conventional Navy deployments.  For example, in an IA, sailors or officers are, as 
the name implies, deployed individually, whereas in conventional Navy deployments, 
personnel are deployed in units.  In addition, IA deployments often come with much 
shorter notice than conventional Navy deployments and the individual is often deployed 
to a non-Navy unit.  For these reasons and others, Navy leadership is interested in 
assessing whether IA deployments are affecting retention. 
A. DESCRIBING INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES 
As shown in Figure 4, between March 2002 and March 2008, almost 20,000 
active component (AC) Navy personnel have been deployed as individual augmentees.  
As Figure 4 shows, the number of IA deployers (“IAers”) has been steadily increasing 
every year since 2002.2
Figure 5 shows that the majority of IAers have been deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, followed by other Middle Eastern countries.  However, Navy personnel 
have also been deployed via IA to other countries around the world, including a 
substantial number to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (contained in OCONUS), as well as to 
various locations in the continental United States (CONUS). 
 
2 Though, with 1,843 personnel deployed in the first quarter of calendar year 2008, it is possible that 
2008 will show the beginning of the leveling off of this trend. 
 Figure 4.   Number of active component Navy personnel starting an 
individual augmentation deployment by year. 
 
Figure 5.   Deployment locations for active component Navy personnel 
deployed via individual augmentation from March 2002 to 
March 2008. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the number of enlisted personnel, officers, and 
warrant officers.  Seventy-two percent of the IAers were enlisted personnel, though 
officers are overrepresented in terms of their size as a fraction of the Navy. 
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 Figure 6.   Number of Navy enlisted personnel, officers, and warrant 
officers deployed via individual augmentation from March 2002 
to March 2008. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of enlisted IAer personnel by pay grade.  While all 
pay grades have deployed, the majority (75 percent) of those who deployed via IA were 
petty officers (E-4 through E-6).  Figure 8 shows the distribution of ranks for 
commissioned officers.  Seventy percent of those who deployed were in ranks O-3 
through O-5 (lieutenant through commander).  A smaller number of warrant officers 
deployed.  As Figure 9 shows, of warrant officers that deployed via IA, 86 percent were 
CWO2 and CWO3. 
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 Figure 7.   Pay grades of Navy enlisted personnel deployed via individual 
augmentation from March 2002 to March 2008. 
 
Figure 8.   Ranks of Navy officers deployed via individual augmentation 
from March 2002 to March 2008. 
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 Figure 9.   Ranks of Navy warrant officers deployed via individual 
augmentation from March 2002 to March 2008. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
In addition to this introductory chapter, this report is divided into three additional 
chapters.  Chapter 2 describes our analytical approach, including the data we used and 
how we determined when an individual made the decision to stay in or leave the Navy.  
Chapter 3 then presents our quantitative results, including both simple univariate 
comparisons and more complicated multivariate models.  Finally, Chapter 4 summarizes 
our findings, discusses some of the limitations of the study, and provides 
recommendations for future research.  These latter recommendations should be of interest 
to researchers and policy makers in the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education). 
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CHAPTER 2:  ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
The analytical approach we chose was to compare retention rates between those 
personnel who had been deployed via individual augmentation to equivalent cohorts of 
Navy personnel who had not been on an IA deployment.  “Equivalent” means matching 
by (or controlling for in multivariate models) observable characteristics such as 
deployment experience, rank/pay grade, warfare specialty/rating, Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) for enlisted personnel, family status, gender, and 
race/ethnicity. 
The goal was to compare cohorts of sailors and junior officers who were both “at 
risk” of going on an IA deployment and of leaving the Navy.  In particular, for enlisted 
personnel we had to observe at least one decision to either stay in or leave the Navy 
between March 2002 and September 2008.  For junior officers, their initial service 
obligation had to expire after March 2002 and within a period of time such that we could 
determine whether they had decided to remain on active duty or leave the service.  
Paisant (2008) fully describes the logic for the junior officer analysis, so in the following 
paragraph we describe it for the enlisted personnel. 
As Figure 10 illustrates, we divided the enlisted population up into “IAers” and 
“non-IAers.”  For both groups, we had to observe at least one decision to either stay in or 
leave the Navy between March 2002 and September 2008.  “IAers” were then defined as 
someone who had been on an IA deployment and subsequently made a decision to stay in 
or leave the Navy.  “Non-IAers” were defined as those individuals for whom we had 
observed a decision point, but they either had not ever been on an IA or their decision 
was made prior to their IA deployment.  This latter case is important since at the point 
where a sailor had made a retention decision he or she had not experienced an IA 
deployment and hence was a non-IAer at that time. 
 Figure 10.   Scheme for including personnel in the analysis and 
classifying them as IAer or non-IAer. 
Implicit in this approach is that we had to ignore individuals for which we did not 
observe a retention decision.  For the non-IAers, as Section A will describe, this left us 
with hundreds of thousands of observations against which to compare the IAers.  
However, there were significantly fewer decision points observed for IAers.  This is both 
due to the small number of IAers compared to non-IAers, but also because more time 
must expire in order to observe decision points for those who have been on a recent IA 
deployment.  This has implications for future research that we will discuss in Chapter 3. 
For each individual, we then compared by, or controlled for, various observable 
characteristics.  As shown in Figure 11, we chose variable characteristics (such as pay 
grade or family status) a year prior to the decision point, where the logic was that 
individuals start to form their decision sometime prior to the actual decision point. 
Ultimately, we then compared retention rates between the IAers and non-IAers in 
the aggregate, by subgroups based on demographic characteristics (such as pay grade or 
family status), and then in multivariate models where we simultaneously controlled for 
all the demographic and other observable characteristics. 
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 Figure 11.   Examples of classification of included personnel as IAer  
or non-IAer. 
A. THE DATA 
The data used to model both the enlisted force and junior officers consisted of a 
list of those AC Navy personnel sent on an IA deployment since March 2002 and 
monthly administrative records for all AC Navy personnel from October 1997 through 
September 2007.  The former was provided by Pers-4 and, among other information, 
contained the name, rank/pay grade, SSN, and date deployed of each individual.  The 
latter was an extract of the Proxy Perstempo file maintained by the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC) and contained monthly information on every person in the Navy, 
including name, rank/pay grade, social security number (SSN), designator/rating, gender, 
race/ethnicity, AFQT scores (for enlisted personnel), expiration of term of service (ETS), 
and a DMDC-derived measure of deployment experience. 
The monthly Proxy Perstempo data was merged by SSN into a single longitudinal 
data file that contained the service history of all 846,653 personnel (represented by 
893,461 records in which some SSNs appeared more than once) who were in the Navy at 
any point in time from October 1997 and September 2007.  We then also merged the 
Pers-4 IA data onto the file by SSN.  This data set was subsequently subset into the 
necessary analytical files, appropriately removing individual identifiers such as name and 
SSN.  Here we describe this process for the enlisted data; see Paisant (2008) for a more 
detailed description of the junior officer data. 
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To create the analytical data file for the enlisted analyses, we first deleted all the 
officer records.  Many of the SSNs with duplicate records seemed to refer to enlisted 
personnel who were later commissioned; we removed these (and all records for any SSN 
with duplicated records in the dataset).  We then removed records for those personnel for 
whom we did not observe a reenlistment decision after March 2002, who did not have 
any deployment experience, who separated from the Navy involuntarily, or who did not 
have any data one year prior to their reenlistment decision.  As Figure 12 shows, the 
893,461 longitudinal records were thus reduced to 233,444 personnel who were enlisted 
in the Navy, made a reenlistment decision after March 2002, never separated 
involuntarily, and who had deployment experience. 
 
Figure 12.   DMDC and IA data counts for enlisted personnel. 
In addition, after merging the IA data, of the 15,469 AC Navy personnel who 
began an IA deployment sometime between March 2002 and September 2007,  
4,534 officer records were deleted and 8,972 had not made a reenlistment decision by 
September 2007 after their IA deployment.  This left 1,963 enlisted personnel who had 
been on an IA deployment and for whom we were subsequently able to observe a 
decision to stay in or leave the Navy. 
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B. INFERRING DECSION POINTS AND DEPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE 
We had to infer a couple of important quantities to conduct our analysis, namely 
the decision point and whether an individual had (non-IA) deployment experience.  Here 
we discuss how we conducted this inference for the enlisted personnel analysis.  For the 
junior officer analysis, please see Paisant (2008). 
1. Defining the Decision Point 
The DMDC data contained a variable that indicated the ETS for each individual 
for each month of data.  For any given month, this variable generally contained the 
number of months remaining in an individual’s enlistment contract.  However, once the 
longitudinal data set was assembled, we were able to determine that this variable did not 
simply count down to zero for all individuals.  For individuals who enlisted prior to the 
end of their contract, for example, at some point in the countdown it would suddenly 
jump up, often to 48 or 72, indicating a new four- or six-year enlistment contract.  For 
others, after having counted down to zero, the ETS would perhaps jump up to one or two 
or three and then count down again, likely indicating an individual who had extended his 
or her enlistment contract for some number of months.  For other individuals, the ETS 
would sometimes be zero for one or more months in the middle of a contract. 
As a result, we used a number of rules to determine if and when individuals 
reenlisted.  These rules were: 
• If the ETS went to zero and stayed there for the remainder of the data, we 
determined that the individual left the Navy at the point the ETS hit zero. 
• If the ETS went to zero in some month, but became nonzero again after 
more than six months, we determined that the individual left the Navy at 
the point the ETS hit zero, and rejoined in the later month. 
• If the ETS went from a number greater than 3 directly to zero in some 
month and became nonzero within six or fewer months, we determined 
that the data was in error and that no event had taken place. 
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• If the ETS went from a number less than or equal to 3 directly to zero in 
some month and became nonzero within six or fewer months, we 
determined that a reenlistment decision had taken place in that first 
nonzero month subsequent to the drop. 
• If the ETS went from a number greater than 3 directly to zero and was 
never again nonzero, we determined that the individual had separated 
involuntarily. 
• We recorded a reenlistment (or enlistment) decision in any month in 
which the ETS exceeded the previous month’s ETS by more than 20, 
except that if such a jump occurred within the first 12 months of the first 
appearance of the individual in the data, the enlistment was marked at that 
individual’s first month of nonzero ETS, not at the spot of that jump. 
2. Defining Deployment 
In order to assess whether an individual had non-IA deployment experience, we 
used inferred measures in the Proxy Perstempo data.  In particular, we relied on the PERS 
Tempo Subgroup field:  see Section 8 of Appendix B of the Proxy Perstempo Codebook 
(available from DMDC). 
CHAPTER 3:  RESULTS 
We compared retention rates in three different ways:  aggregate comparisons, 
comparisons by individual demographic categories, and then using models to 
simultaneously control for demographic and other observable characteristics.  We present 
these results in detail for enlisted personnel and summarize the results for junior officers.  
More detail for junior officer comparisons can be found in Paisant (2008). 
A. AGGREGATE RESULTS 
We begin by simply comparing the retention rates between IAers and non-IAers, 
both enlisted personnel and junior officers.  As shown in Figure 13, almost 67 percent of 
enlisted IAers reenlisted compared to almost 61 percent of non-IAers—a six percent 
difference in reenlistment rates in favor of the IAers.  Moreover, as shown in Figure 14, 
the difference for junior officers is even greater:  66 percent of the junior officer IAers 
were retained compared to only 43 percent of the non-IAers—a 23 percent difference in 
retention rates in favor of the IAers. 
 
Figure 13.   Percent of non-IAer and IAer enlisted personnel retained. 
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 Figure 14.   Percent of non-IAer and IAer junior officers retained. 
The tables in Figure 15 show the raw numbers (junior officers on the left and 
enlisted personnel on the right). 
            
Figure 15.   Two-way tabulations of the number of junior officers (left table) 
and enlisted personnel (right table) who were retained or not by 
whether they went on an IA deployment or not. 
A way to think about these results is in terms of “odds of retention” for each 
group, which is the fraction retained for that group divided by the fraction not retained.  
For the enlisted personnel, the odds that an IAer is retained is 2.01 (i.e., twice as many 
enlisted IAers are retained as lost), while the odds that a non-IAer is retained is 1.55.  In 
this comparison, higher odds are better.  Similarly, the odds of retention for a junior 
officer IAer is 1.94, while the odds for non-IAer junior officers is only 0.76.  Odds of less 
than one means that more non-IAer officers are lost than retained, as we see in Figure 14. 
We can further compare between IAers and non-IAers in terms of an “odds ratio,” 
or the ratio of the odds IAers are retained to the odds non-IAers are retained.  This 
reduces the comparison to one number.  For the enlisted personnel, the odds ratio is 1.30 
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and for the junior officers it is 2.56.  An odds ratio greater than one means that the odds 
that IAers are retained is greater than the odds that non-IAers are retained.  While the 
odds ratios are a rather complicated way to distill the results of Figures 13 and 14 down 
into single numbers, we mention them here as they will be useful in Section C to compare 
these aggregate results with those from the multivariate models. 
Regardless of the metric used, it is clear that the aggregate results show IAers 
have a higher retention rate than non-IAers for both enlisted personnel and junior 
officers.  Of course, these aggregate results may mask retention issues for certain 
subgroups, an issue we explore in Section B. 
B. UNIVARIATE COMPARISON RESULTS 
In this section, we evaluate how retention varies between IAers and non-IAers by 
various demographics:  gender, family status, race/ethnicity, and pay grade.  The question 
is whether there is evidence that IAers of a particular demographic have lower retention 
rates than their non-IA counterparts.  We begin with enlisted personnel. 
1. Enlisted Personnel 
Figures 16 and 17 show that when we compare retention rates between IAers and 
non-IAers by gender and family status, IAers are retained at a higher rate in all the 
comparison categories.  For example, in Figure 16, we see that IAers have a higher 
retention rate for both males and females.  Similarly, in Figure 17, IAers have a higher 
retention rate across all categories of family status. 
In Figure 18, we see that this result continues to hold when we compare IAers to 
non-IAers by race/ethnicity.  However, in Figure 19, we see that the retention rates for 
some pay grades are lower for IAers compared to their non-IAer counterparts.  In 
particular, we see that the rates are lower for E-2s, E-4s, E-5s, and E-9s.  In terms of the  
 Figure 16.   Comparison of the percent retained by gender and IA status.  For 
both males and females, the percent retained is higher for those 
who deployed via IA. 
 
Figure 17.   Comparison of the percent retained by family and IA status.  For 
all family statuses, the percent retained is higher for those who 
deployed via IA. 
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 Figure 18.   Comparison of the percent retained by race/ethnicity and IA 
status.  For all race/ethnicities, the percent retained is higher for 
those who deployed via IA. 
 
Figure 19.   Comparison of the percent retained by pay grade and IA status.  
E-2, E-4, E-5, and E-9 personnel on IAs had a slightly lower 
retention rates than non-IAers in those pay grades. 
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E-2s and E-9s, the number of IAers is too small to reach any definitive conclusion from 
this comparison:  there were only 9 E-2s and 13 E-9s for which we observed a retention 
decision.  However, for E-4s and E-5s, we observed hundreds of retention decisions 
(specifically, 373 for E-4s and 604 for E-5s), though the difference in retention rates was 
only about one percent in each case. 
 A closer inspection of Figure 19 suggests that there may be a relationship between 
pay grade and retention, where the difference in retention rates increases with increasing 
pay grade.  To assess this, taking into account the number of individuals observed in each 
pay grade, we conducted a weighted regression of the difference in percent retained  
(i.e., percent IAers retained minus percent non-IAers retained). 
Figure 20 shows the difference in percent retained and the number of IAs (which 
we used as the weighting factor).  On the left, we see the fitted regression line overlaid on 
the plot of the percent differences versus pay grade and at the bottom, the resulting 
equation of the line.  Assuming a linear relationship, this suggests there is about a  
three-percent increase in the difference for every pay grade increase.  It also suggests 
that, treating our observations as a sample from the whole population of possible Naval 
personnel, retention rates are lower for IAers in the population with pay grades less than 
E-5, than for non-IAers in that population. 
 
Figure 20.   A weighted linear regression of the difference (∆) in percent 
retained by pay grade. 
 18
Now, it is not obvious how or why such a difference in pay grades might arise.  
We hypothesize that it is not an effect of pay grade per se, but rather some other 
(unobserved) factor that is correlated with pay grade, such as the fraction of IA 
volunteers within each pay grade.  We discuss this more in Chapter 4. 
2. Junior Officers 
The story is very similar for junior officers.  Figure 21 shows the retention 
proportions among IAers and non-IAers by gender for this subgroup (see Paisant [2008] 
for the details of which officers are included here).  In both genders, the IAer retention 
proportion is higher than that of the non-IAers, with a somewhat larger difference  
among females. 
 
Figure 21.   Comparison of the percent retained by gender and IA status.  For 
both genders, the percent retained is higher for those who 
deployed via IA than for those who did not. 
Figure 21, analogous to Figure 17, shows that IAers are retained at a higher rate 
than non-IAers for all family types, and Figures 22 and 23 shows the corresponding 
results by family status and by race.  (In this last case, some of the sample sizes are 
small.)  Overall, we can see the same basic result with the junior officers that was seen 
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Figure 22.   Comparison of the percent retained by family type and IA status.  
For all family types, the percent retained is higher for those who 








































































































Figure 23.   Comparison of the percent retained by race and IA status.  The 
percentage retained is higher for those who deployed via IA than 
for those who did not for every race group; although some of the 
sample sizes are quite small. 
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Finally, Figure 24 shows that retention percentages are higher for IAers than  
non-IAers at every rank.  (We have excluded ranks O1 and O2 because there were, 




















Figure 24.   Comparison of the percent retained by rank and IA status.  The 
percentage retained is higher for those who deployed via IA than 
for those who did not for each of the three ranks. 
C. MULTIVARIATE MODEL RESULTS 
While the foregoing comparisons assess the differences in retention rates between 
IAers and non-IAers by various demographic categories, these categories are only 
assessed one at a time.  It is possible that the previous results could differ in a comparison 
that simultaneously incorporates all the demographics. 
To conduct such a comparison, we employed a standard statistical modeling 
technique—logistic regression—to construct our models.  For those unfamiliar with 
logistic regression, the Appendix provides a brief overview of the methodology. 
1. Enlisted Personnel 
For the enlisted personnel models, we included covariates in the model to account 
for known retention rate differences among various demographics (gender, race/ethnicity, 
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and family status), covariates that act as surrogates for personnel quality (AFQT, 
education), a covariate to account for seniority (pay grade), and a covariate to act as a 
surrogate for changes in the U.S. economy that may affect overall retention propensity 
(decision year). 
We then ran two separate models, one comparing all IAers to non-IAers and a 
second one comparing only those IAers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to non-IAers.  
The results are shown in Tables 1 and 2.  As described in the Appendix, exponentiating 
the coefficient for the IA indicator gives the odds ratio for the retention of IAers versus 
the retention of non-IAers.  We see from Table 1 that the odds ratio for all IAers is 
 and, for Table 2, the odds ratio for Iraq and Afghanistan IAers is 
.  The result is that, after simultaneously controlling for observable 
demographics and other characteristics, the odds ratio increased from 1.3 in the raw data 
(see Section A of this chapter) to 1.53 and then, focusing only on those who deployed to 






Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept –0.386 0.144 7.2 0.0072
Race/Ethnicity[Am. 
Ind/Alaskan Native] 
–0.162 0.026 38.6 <.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Asian/Pac 
Islander] 
0.298 0.018 261.7 <.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Black] 0.263 0.013 387.5 <.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Hispanic] –0.058 0.015 14.8 0.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Other] –0.132 0.041 10.3 0.0013
Family Status[Joint Marriage] 0.124 0.020 39.2 <.0001
Family Status[Married] 0.159 0.009 295.5 <.0001
Family Status[Single] –0.249 0.010 673.3 <.0001
AFQT[Cat I] 0.613 0.079 61.0 <.0001
AFQT[Cat II] 0.687 0.077 80.1 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IIIA] 0.603 0.077 61.6 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IIIB] 0.565 0.077 54.2 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IVA] 0.200 0.079 6.4 0.0115
AFQT[Cat IVB] –1.129 0.101 123.7 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IVC] –0.994 0.135 54.0 <.0001
Pay Grade[E1] –0.748 0.077 93.2 <.0001
Pay Grade[E2] –0.198 0.039 26.3 <.0001
Pay Grade[E3] –0.238 0.017 190.0 <.0001
Pay Grade[E4] 0.006 0.015 0.2 0.6601
Pay Grade[E5] 0.412 0.015 743.0 <.0001
Pay Grade[E6] 0.321 0.016 412.8 <.0001
Pay Grade[E7] 0.191 0.019 101.2 <.0001
Pay Grade[E8] –0.033 0.028 1.4 0.2374
Education[Bachelor's] –0.079 0.124 0.4 0.5218
Education[Doctorate] 0.398 0.500 0.6 0.4256
Education[GED/Alt] 0.028 0.122 0.1 0.8154
Education[HS] 0.139 0.121 1.3 0.2497
Education[LT HS] –0.014 0.124 0.0 0.9109
Education[Masters] –0.051 0.165 0.1 0.7571
Education[Nursing Degree] –0.422 0.682 0.4 0.5363
Decision_Year[2002] 0.626 0.010 4200.9 <.0001
Decision_Year[2003] –0.067 0.009 50.4 <.0001
Decision_Year[2004] –0.017 0.009 3.1 0.0775
Decision_Year[2005] –0.099 0.010 101.1 <.0001
Decision_Year[2006] –0.098 0.010 88.2 <.0001
IA_Deployer_Ind 0.426 0.051 70.8 <.0001
Table 1. Results for enlisted model comparing all enlisted IAers versus all other 
Navy enlisted with deployment experience. 
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Term Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept –0.390 0.144 7.4 0.0066
Race/Ethnicity[Am. 
Ind/Alaskan Native] 
–0.165 0.026 39.8 <.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Asian/Pac 
Islander] 
0.298 0.018 261.5 <.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Black] 0.265 0.013 390.4 <.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Hispanic] –0.059 0.015 14.8 0.0001
Race/Ethnicity[Other] –0.131 0.041 10.1 0.0015
Family Status[Joint Marriage] 0.123 0.020 37.9 <.0001
Family Status[Married] 0.161 0.009 298.9 <.0001
Family Status[Single] –0.249 0.010 670.0 <.0001
AFQT[Cat I] 0.612 0.079 60.7 <.0001
AFQT[Cat II] 0.689 0.077 80.5 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IIIA] 0.605 0.077 62.0 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IIIB] 0.565 0.077 54.2 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IVA] 0.205 0.079 6.7 0.0095
AFQT[Cat IVB] –1.128 0.102 123.4 <.0001
AFQT[Cat IVC] –1.004 0.136 54.8 <.0001
Pay Grade[E1] –0.750 0.078 93.6 <.0001
Pay Grade[E2] –0.197 0.039 25.8 <.0001
Pay Grade[E3] –0.237 0.017 187.8 <.0001
Pay Grade[E4] 0.008 0.015 0.3 0.5675
Pay Grade[E5] 0.413 0.015 743.7 <.0001
Pay Grade[E6] 0.322 0.016 412.5 <.0001
Pay Grade[E7] 0.190 0.019 99.0 <.0001
Pay Grade[E8] –0.035 0.028 1.6 0.2106
Education[Bachelor's] –0.080 0.124 0.4 0.5173
Education[Doctorate] 0.399 0.500 0.6 0.4245
Education[GED/Alt] 0.028 0.122 0.1 0.8171
Education[HS] 0.140 0.121 1.3 0.2464
Education[LT HS] –0.014 0.124 0.0 0.9081
Education[Masters] –0.053 0.165 0.1 0.7475
Education[Nursing Degree] –0.420 0.682 0.4 0.5382
Decision_Year[2002] 0.626 0.010 4199.3 <.0001
Decision_Year[2003] –0.067 0.009 50.5 <.0001
Decision_Year[2004] –0.017 0.009 3.1 0.0789
Decision_Year[2005] –0.100 0.010 102.0 <.0001
Decision_Year[2006] –0.098 0.011 86.8 <.0001
IA_Deployer_Ind 0.659 0.075 77.4 <.0001
Table 2. Results for enlisted model comparing only those enlisted IAers who 
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan versus all other Navy enlisted with  
deployment experience. 
2. Junior Officers 
Here we reproduce the results of Paisant (2008).  As shown in Table 3, in his 
model he controlled for race/ethnicity, family status, and warfare specialty.  After 
controlling for these demographics, the odds ratio for the retention of IAers is 
.  This turns out to be insignificantly different from the raw odds ratio 
of 2.56 calculated in Section A of this chapter.  Hence, though there are effects 
attributable to these population demographics, once they are accounted for, there is no 
real difference in the odds ratio attributable to IA deployments. 
exp(0.944) 2.57=
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CHAPTER 4:  SUMMARY 
In this analysis, we evaluated whether retention rates for Navy enlisted personnel 
and junior officers differ between those personnel who have been deployed via IA and 
their Navy colleagues who experienced conventional Navy deployments.  In our models, 
we have attempted to control for differences in retention behavior attributable to other 
personnel demographics—such as rank/pay grade, family status, gender, and 
race/ethnicity—before evaluating the effect of IA deployment on retention. 
Overall, we find little evidence thus far that IA deployment is hurting retention 
rates among those who have experienced one or more IA deployments.  In fact, in almost 
all of our comparisons, the retention rates of those who have had one or more IA 
deployments were higher than their Navy colleagues who have only been on 
conventional Navy deployments.  The only categories where we found lower retention 
rates for IAers compared to non-IAers were for E-3s and E-4s and, in these cases, the 
decrease in retention rates was only about one percent.  (We also found decreases for  
E-2s and E-9s, but the number of IAers in those groups was too small to be  
considered definitive.) 
These findings must be tempered with a number of caveats: 
• Though IA deployments have been occurring for six years now, we were 
only able to observe retention decisions on a fraction of those who have 
been on an IA deployment and these were more likely to be individuals 
who deployed early in OIF.  Hence, the results observed thus far may not 
be typical of what is yet to come.  See paragraph A.1 below for  
additional discussion. 
• We were not able to identify those who volunteered for an IA deployment 
from those who did not.  Thus, it is possible that a higher retention rate for 
volunteers is masking a lower rate for nonvolunteers.  See paragraph A.2 
below for additional discussion. 
 28
• Similarly, because this is observational data with strong self-selection 
effects likely present (at least for the volunteers), it is not possible to 
conclude that there is any causal relationship between IA deployments and 
increased retention rates.  For example, it could be that volunteers are also 
more likely to stay in the Navy and hence the higher retention rates for 
IAers are simply due to the choice of the IA volunteers. 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that our results are about aggregate 
retention behavior, not individual retention propensities.  We expect Navy leadership is 
most interested in the former where, as we have discussed, there is some utility in 
knowing that retention rates among IAers (at least as observed thus far) are generally 
higher.  However, the latter is also relevant since it is possible that the IA experience does 
decrease each individual’s retention propensity slightly, but not enough to overcome the 
inherently higher retention propensities in the self-selected volunteer group.  Hence, for 
example, while we observed higher retention rates for the IAers, it may be that they are 
not as high as they would have been in the absence of the IA program.  Thus, we 
emphasize that in this research we were not able to assess whether: 
• any particular individual’s propensity to remain on active duty was 
affected by his or her IA deployment experience, nor 
• whether the retention propensity of individuals who have not yet been 
deployed as  individual augmentees were affected by the possibility they 
could be sent on an IA deployment. 
That said, based on this research, we conclude the following: 
• With the exception of some junior enlisted pay grades (E-3s and E-4s), the 
retention rates for Navy enlisted personnel and junior officers is higher for 
those who deployed on an IA than for other Navy personnel who 
experienced conventional Navy deployments. 
• The hypothesis that IA deployment causes a significant decrease in 
retention propensity is unlikely to be true, at least in terms of the personnel 
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outcomes observed thus far.  If it was, we would have expected to see 
lower retention rates for IAers than for non-IAers. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Given the previous caveats, and that we were not able to assess some groups, we 
suggest that additional, on-going research is warranted.  In particular, we recommend 
consideration of the following six areas for future research. 
1. Repeat Analysis Annually 
While this research has not found any strong negative effects on retention, it is 
important to keep in mind that outcomes have been observed on only a small fraction of 
those who have been on an IA deployment.  An outcome for enlisted personnel is the 
decision to reenlist or leave the Navy and for junior officers it is the decision to continue 
in the Navy after the initial service obligation or leave the Navy.  In both cases, it takes 
between four and six years to observe such an outcome (either from the start of an 
enlistment contract for enlisted personnel or from commissioning for junior officers).  
Since IAs have only been conducted for the past six years, for most of those who have 
deployed via IA, their decision to stay or leave the Navy has not been observed.  Thus, as 
outcomes are observed for more sailors and officers, the conclusions of this report  
could change. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that in this data we were more likely to 
observe outcomes for those who deployed earlier rather than more recently.  To the 
extent that those individuals differed in their Navy career intentions from later individuals 
who deployed via IA, these results could also change.  In addition, the course of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan has changed substantially over the course of the past six years 
and will likely to continue to change into the future.  To the extent that an IAer’s 
deployed experience affects his or her Navy career intentions, these changes in the course 
of the wars may affect the observed retention patterns. 
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2. Identify and Analyze Nonvolunteers 
In this research, we were not able to identify those who volunteered for an IA 
deployment.  Presumably, such individuals are more likely to stay in the Navy.  If true, 
and if volunteers were more likely to be senior enlisted personnel, then the observed 
association between increasing retention and pay grade for IAers may actually be 
attributable to volunteer status.  Or, perhaps more likely, there exists both an effect due to 
seniority and volunteer status.  In any case, we are not able to identify the volunteer effect 
due to lack of data. 
In addition, a relevant analysis, if nonvolunteers can be identified, is to assess the 
retention patterns of nonvolunteers.  That is, if the assumption that volunteers are more 
likely to stay in the Navy, and because they volunteered are more likely to positively 
view their IA deployment experience, then in the current analysis, the volunteers may be 
masking lower retention rates among the nonvolunteers.  That is, if there is a negative 
effect of IA deployment, it is presumably most likely to be observed among  
the nonvolunteers. 
In discussion with Pers-4, it is our understanding that some data is available for 
some IAers regarding their volunteer status.  Though we were not able to obtain that data 
for this study, future studies should incorporate it, if possible. 
3. Analyze Reservists 
As described in Chapter 1, the majority of IAers are reservists.  This analysis only 
considered AC sailors and junior officers.  There is no reason to believe that the effects of 
IA deployment are the same for RC personnel as for AC personnel, and hence these 
results should not be extrapolated to RC personnel.  Indeed, there are many ways in 
which the two components differ, and one can rationalize many ways in which an IA 
deployment might have a more positive or more negative effect on RC personnel 
(compared to AC personnel). 
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4. Analyze Mid-Grade Officers and Warrant Officers 
Because outcomes for mid-grade officers (defined as O-3s past their initial service 
obligation decision point through 0-5s) and warrant officers were not sufficiently 
observed, they were not analyzed in this study.  That is, as described in paragraph A.1 
above, decision points for many of sailors and junior officers have not been observed in 
the six years since IA deployments began.  This problem is even greater for mid-grade 
officers and warrant officers who have made a least an initial commitment to a naval 
career and whose decision timelines are even more extended. 
Simply put, not enough time has expired to observe enough mid-grade and 
warrant officers with IA deployment experience leaving the service.  However, as time 
progresses, such analyses, if they are desired, will become possible. 
5. Evaluate Using Other Outcomes 
In this analysis, we have used retention as the relevant comparison measure 
between those who have been on an IA deployment and those who have not.  In the 
process of conducting the evaluation, however, we removed those personnel who were 
involuntarily separated, under the assumption that we were interested in comparing the 
retention and separation rates among those who chose to stay in or leave the Navy. 
However, other measures may be relevant.  In particular, if IA deployments are 
causing increases in involuntary separations (say for mental health reasons), then our 
analysis would not have been able to detect this and such an increase could also be 
relevant to the question of how IAs are affecting retention in the Navy.  Thus, future 
studies could assess the types and rates of involuntary separation between IAers and  
non-IAers. 
6. Conduct Survey and Connect Attitudinal to Outcome Data 
In these analyses, we have conducted an analysis of the most concrete measure of 
whether IAs are affecting retention by looking at actual retention behavior.  However, 
this is an evaluation of aggregate behavior and, as such, it cannot assess whether, even 
 32
though an individual was retained in the Navy, his or her future propensity to remain on 
active duty has been increased or decreased in some way by the IA experience. 
One way to take a step closer to evaluating this and similar questions is by using a 
survey to collect attitudinal and other data on those who deployed via IA and then 
connect the survey data to the outcome data.  In so doing, it may be possible to assess 
whether and how various aspects of the IA deployment experience influenced an 
individual’s decision to stay in or leave the Navy. 
APPENDIX:  OVERVIEW OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Standard logistic regression models were used for both the enlisted and junior 
officer models.  An interesting deviation from their usual employment, however, is that 
we have virtually the entire population of (eligible) sailors and naval officers in our data.  
Thus, we are not using the models for making inference to a larger population from a 
sample.  Rather, we are using the models to parsimoniously summarize the relationship 
between retention and IA deployment, after accounting for other factors that  
affect retention. 
Logistic regression is a well-known statistical technique for modeling data with 
binary outcomes—such as whether an individual decides to remain on active duty or not.  
Detailed discussions and the mathematical development of the technique can be found in 
textbooks such as McCullaugh and Nelder (1991) or Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989).  We 
denote the outcome for individual i by Yi, which is 1 if the individual stays on active duty 
and 0 otherwise.  The basic form of the model is then 
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p−   is referred to as the odds for individual i.  The coefficients in the 
model represent the change in the log odds for a unit change in an X covariate.  The Xs 
capture the various demographic characteristics for the individuals, such as gender, race, 
occupation, and rate of deployment.3  In logistic regression, the log-odds are generally 
assumed to be a linear function of various covariates. 
                                                 
3 An X with two subscripts is a particular value for a particular observation, so X3G is the gender of 
person number 3.  An X with one subscript refers to the whole set of observations for that characteristic, so 
XM refer to the whole set of marital status values. 
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The odds are defined as the probability that an individual with a particular set of 
characteristics will stay in the military, divided by the probability that he or she will not.  
The odds can be any number between zero and infinity.  Odds of one means that an 
individual with those characteristics is equally likely to separate as not.  Odds greater 
than one means that such an individual is more likely to stay on active duty, while odds 
less than one means the individual is more likely to separate. 
Through algebraic manipulation, we can explicitly estimate the probability of 
retention for the ith individual, ˆ ip , as a function of the coefficients: 
0 1 1
0 1 1








+ + += + + + + , 
where the βˆ s are the coefficients estimated from the data via maximum likelihood. 
Unfortunately, changes in ˆ ip are not linear with changes in the βˆ , so there is no 
simple way to summarize how the βˆ s directly affect the probability of retention over all 
possible ranges.  However, ( )ˆexp jβ  can be interpreted as the odds ratio (OR) when Xj is 
a binary characteristic.  The odds ratio is simply the ratio of the odds when Xj = 1 to the 
odds when Xj = 0 and is roughly equivalent to the relative risk.  If OR = 2, then we 
interpret this to mean that individuals with characteristic Xj = 1 are twice as likely, on 
average, to stay in the service as those with Xj = 0.  Such a change might have the effect 
of changing the odds of staying in from 1 to 1 (“even money”) to 1 to 2 (representing a 
change in probability from 0.5 to 0.67), or it might change the odds of staying in from 
100 to 1 to 50 to 1 (representing a change in probability from roughly 0.001 to 0.02). 
Because of the nonlinear relationship between the ˆ ip  and the βˆ , this model cannot 
measure the effect of changes in βˆ  directly on the values of ˆ ip . 
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